How not to refute the natural lottery argument

From the National Center for Policy Analysis (a libertarian think tank which aims "to develop and promote private alternatives to government regulation and control, solving problems by relying on the strength of the competitive, entrepreneurial private sector") on the natural lottery argument, as used to support the claim that "society should mitigate the results of a natural misfortune by partly socializing the cost of harms over which human beings have no control" (in its so-called "one stop shop for debate issues"):

The most direct response to the natural lottery argument is to deny the premise. True enough, it's not the unlucky person's fault that he was unlucky. But it's not your fault either. And it's not obvious why someone else's misfortune should give rise to a claim against your good fortune.

The premise in question is that persons cannot be held responsible (i.e. made to bear the costs of or granted exclusive entitlement to benefits from) for their natural endowments, and the above reply grants acknowledges half of this in granting that "it's not the unlucky person's fault that he was unlucky." From this premise, it does follow that "it's not your fault either" (as is acknowledged, these result from luck and so are nobody's fault), though not in the way that the above claim supposes. The only part of the premise that is being denied, then, is the aspect of moral desert that follows from good fortune: persons are asymmetrically held to be responsible for their good fortune (and thus entitled to it, against claims of justice based in the natural lottery argument) but not for their bad fortune.

One cannot have it both ways: either persons deserve the good or bad consequences that result from the "natural lottery" of their native endowments, or they do not. If they don't, they are no more entitled to their good fortunes than others are to their bad fortunes. The premise that is actually being denied in the above argument is the "control condition" that holds persons to be responsible for consequences that result from their voluntary acts and choices but not for those which follow from luck alone. While this reply to the natural lottery argument is not entirely inconceivable, it must somehow justify the claim (denied above) that it is the unlucky person's fault that he is unlucky, and that he therefore deserves the significantly diminished life prospects which follow (as the fortunate also deserve their significantly enhanced life prospects, and are thus immune to claims on behalf of the disadvantaged to minimize these unequal opportunities). Insofar as libertarians recognize this inequality of opportunity to be a problem (and most do not), I doubt that "the strength of the competitive, entrepreneurial private sector" can provide a better solution to it than the warmed-over Social Darwinism that is often invoked (though not, to the author's credit, above) in debates over the role of the state in promoting social justice.